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ANTICIPATORY OVERRULINGS, INVITATIONS, TIME 
BOMBS, AND INADVERTENCE: HOW SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW 
Richard L. Hasen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Without doubt, the Supreme Court’s most prominent decision so far under 
the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts has been Citizens United v. FEC.1 
This 5–4 decision, striking down corporate campaign spending limits against a 
First Amendment challenge2 and overruling two earlier Supreme Court 
precedents,3 has been the subject not only of sustained academic commentary 
and editorial criticism4 but also of controversial criticism from President 
Obama in his 2010 State of the Union speech in the presence of a number of 
Supreme Court Justices.5 Critics have condemned Citizens United as the 
decision of an “activist” Supreme Court, while supporters have cheered the 
 
 * Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Bill Araiza, 
Josh Douglas, Lee Epstein, Doug Laycock, Christopher Leslie, Rick Pildes, and Adam Winkler for useful 
comments and suggestions. 
 1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2 See id. at 886, 913. 
 3 Id.; accord McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
876; Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
876. The Court in Citizens United overruled one of the two major holdings of McConnell concerning spending 
limits on certain corporate- and labor-union-funded election advertising. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
Challengers have now gone after the other major holding of McConnell, the portion of the case upholding the 
party “soft-money” limitations of the 2002 McCain–Feingold law. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC 
(RNC), 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). Though RNC was a poor 
vehicle for overturning McConnell, “[i]f the RNC refiles its case as a straightforward facial challenge to 
McConnell’s soft money holding, I would be unsurprised i[f] the Court took the case and then either 
overturned McConnell or whittled it away first, along the lines of [FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 
II)].” Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 621 n.262 
(2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 36–40 (discussing Justice Alito’s stated desire for express 
argument and full briefing before considering the overruling of precedent). 
 4 For articles on Citizens United, see Hasen, supra note 3, at 603–04 nn.173–77. My own views on the 
case appear in Hasen, supra note 3; Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion 
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2011) [hereinafter Hasen, Citizens United]; and Richard L. Hasen, 
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 [hereinafter 
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance]. 
 5 See Adam Liptak, A Justice Responds to Criticism from Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17. 
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Court for correcting earlier errant precedent in conflict with the First 
Amendment.6 
As Barry Friedman has pointed out in a recent Georgetown Law Journal 
article, the Supreme Court does not always move the law in such a prominent 
fashion.7 Despite the Citizens United ruling, and maybe now more because of 
the public reaction to it, express overrulings of precedent are rare. The Roberts 
Court also has engaged in “stealth overruling.” Stealth overruling occurs when 
the Court does not explicitly overrule an existing precedent. Instead, it “fail[s] 
to extend a precedent to the conclusion mandated by its rationale,” or it 
“reduc[es] a precedent to nothing.”8 Using the example of the Roberts Court’s 
treatment of Miranda v. Arizona,9 Friedman demonstrates how the Court has 
been able to greatly reduce the precedential force of the Miranda case without 
incurring public scrutiny and criticism.10 Friedman is critical of stealth 
overruling on a number of grounds, most importantly because “stealth 
overruling obscures the path of constitutional law from public view, allowing 
the Court to alter constitutional meaning without public supervision.”11 
I leave to others the question whether the Roberts Court empirically 
engages in more (stealth) overruling than earlier groups of Supreme Court 
Justices did and, even if the Roberts Court does so, whether a higher overruling 
rate is grounds for condemnation.12 Instead, the more modest aim of this brief 
Essay is to catalog additional tools that Supreme Court Justices can use beyond 
express and stealth overruling to move the law. I also explain why Justices 
might choose to use one, rather than another, of these tools to move the law. 
 
 6 Consider the recent heated debate between Floyd Abrams and Burt Neuborne in The Nation. Floyd 
Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating Citizens United, NATION, Jan. 31, 2011, at 19. 
 7 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 
99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2010). 
 8 Id. at 12. 
 9 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 10 Friedman, supra note 7, at 16–25. 
 11 Id. at 63. 
 12 The Roberts Court did not invent stealth overruling. For example, the Warren Court’s famous 1962 
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held reapportionment claims to be justiciable under the 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, id. at 237, seems to be a stealth overruling of Colegrove v. Green, 328 
U.S. 549 (1946), which held that such reapportionment claims are not justiciable under the Constitution’s 
Guarantee Clause, id. at 556 (plurality opinion). I do note on the condemnation point that, if existing Supreme 
Court precedent deviates more from the ideal point of the median Justice on the Roberts Court than precedent 
deviated from the ideal point of the median Justice on earlier Courts, we could see more overruling now, even 
if earlier groups of Justices were equally “activist” in terms of willingness to overturn precedent with which 
they disagreed. 
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In particular, I analyze four additional tools. “Anticipatory overruling” 
occurs when the Court does not overrule precedent but suggests its intention to 
do so in a future case. “Invitations” exist when one or more Justices invite (1) 
litigants to argue for the overruling of precedent in future cases or (2) Congress 
to overrule Supreme Court statutory precedent. “Time bombs” exist when 
Justices include within a case subtle dicta or analysis not necessary to decide it 
with an eye toward influencing how the Court will decide a future case. 
“Inadvertence” occurs when the Court changes the law without consciously 
attempting to do so, through attempts to restate existing law in line with the 
writing Justice’s values.13 
These tools demonstrate how Justices with a long time horizon and 
patience sometimes can move the law both subtly (sometimes even 
unconsciously) and forcefully. Part I describes these four tools, using 
illustrations from Roberts Court cases, primarily in the election law and 
remedies arenas. Part II briefly compares the costs and benefits of these tools 
to each other and to express and stealth overruling, and notes that the tools 
function to send signals to different audiences: lower courts, Congress, the 
public, and other members of the Court. 
I. FOUR (MORE) WAYS JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW 
Whether one accepts the “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court Justices,14 
there seems to be little question that, on occasion, Justices on the Supreme 
Court wish to change existing law. Indeed, given the nearly complete freedom 
the Supreme Court has in choosing cases to review,15 perhaps the most 
 
 13 As will become clear, inadvertence is not a conscious tool used by Justices the way these other tools 
are used. 
 14 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
(1993). The attitudinal model says that the Supreme Court decides cases based on the “ideological attitudes 
and values of the justices.” Id. at 65. 
 15 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 20 UTAH L. REV. 433, 446 
(2011). A number of election law cases still make it to the Court on direct appeal through three-judge courts. 
See id. at 455. When a case comes on appeal, the Court’s decision not to hear the case has precedential value, 
unlike the system that applies for denials of discretionary writs of certiorari. See id. at 455–56. For this reason, 
the Court is more likely to grant hearings from direct appeals. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 36–38 (2003) (discussing the 
reasons the Supreme Court’s poll tax case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), was 
decided through a full opinion and not through a summary affirmance and dissent). For background on the 
direct-appeal process, see Douglas, supra, at 14–18, 23–25; Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District 
Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 132 (1996). 
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common reason that a Justice will vote to hear a case will be to make some 
change in existing law.16 
The strongest and most definitive way for Supreme Court Justices to move 
the law is through express, direct action: expressly overruling or extending 
precedent. But there are at least four reasons why such express action may be 
unavailable or undesirable in a particular case: (1) no majority of Justices may 
be willing to move the law in a particular direction; (2) express overruling or 
extension of precedent might lead to fractious 5–4 decisions, which Justices 
might wish to avoid for reasons of collegiality or otherwise; (3) jurisdictional 
or prudential concerns may lead the Court to decline to expressly overrule or 
extend precedent; or (4) Justices may fear public opinion or retaliation by the 
political branches.17 Accordingly, Justices might sometimes look to move the 
law in other, less direct ways. 
A. Anticipatory Overruling 
Though Citizens United is thus far the most famous case of the Roberts 
Court, it was almost the second most famous case.18 The public is scarcely 
aware of it, but in 2009 the Supreme Court in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO) came very close to 
overturning a key portion of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), widely considered 
a crown jewel of the civil rights movement, and overruling earlier cases going 
back to 1966 that upheld the Act’s constitutionality.19 The portion of the VRA 
at issue, section 5, requires jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination 
in voting to seek permission, or preclearance, from the Department of Justice 
 
 16 Supreme Court Rule 10 provides a nonexhaustive list of reasons for the Court’s use of a discretionary 
grant of a writ of certiorari to review a lower court case. See SUP. CT. R. 10. The rule lists the following 
reasons to grant certiorari: (1) conflicts among lower courts on a controlling legal question, (2) a lower court 
so straying from existing law that the Court’s role as a supervisory court comes into play, and (3) a lower court 
deciding an important federal question that has not been decided by the Supreme Court. See id. Each of these 
is an occasion for the Court to change the law. See id. The rule concludes: “A petition for a writ of certiorari is 
rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly 
stated rule of law.” Id. Here and throughout this discussion, I leave aside the scenario in which the Justices 
decide cases truly of first impression, where there is no precedent to extend or reverse. 
 17 On the extent to which courts respond to majoritarian pressures, see Friedman, supra note 7, at 33; and 
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103. 
 18 Then again, given path dependency, perhaps the Court in Citizens United would not have expressly 
overturned precedent had it first faced a severely negative public reaction from an earlier decision striking 
down the Voting Rights Act (VRA). 
 19 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009). 
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or a D.C. court before making any changes in voting rules.20 The claim made 
in NAMUDNO was that the preclearance requirement exceeded congressional 
powers given the lack of contemporary evidence of discrimination by the 
covered jurisdictions.21 
A decision striking down section 5 would have had huge symbolic 
significance, likely evoking an even greater negative public reaction than the 
reaction to Citizens United. But instead of overruling the precedent and 
striking down the VRA, the Court engaged in a tortured statutory analysis to 
avoid doing so, all the while signaling that it would not be so charitable when 
reviewing the constitutional question in the next case.22 NAMUDNO, therefore, 
was a case of anticipatory overruling. Anticipatory overruling occurs when the 
Court does not overrule precedent but suggests its intention to do so in a future 
case. 
In a surprising and relatively short opinion, the Court, in an 8–1 vote, 
decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district was 
entitled to “bail out” from coverage under the VRA, despite clear text and 
legislative history indicating that only jurisdictions that register voters (which 
the utility district did not do) were entitled to bail out.23 The Court’s opinion, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts, engaged in a detailed exposition of the 
serious constitutional questions raised by the case.24 The Court noted that 
“[t]he Act . . . differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition 
that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”25 It said a departure from this 
principle “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”26 It flagged the federalism 
concerns and noted the danger that “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address may 
no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”27 
After noting that the coverage formula (as to which jurisdictions are covered 
by a preclearance requirement) is thirty-five years old and possibly outdated, 
the Court noted that “Congress heard warnings from supporters of extending 
 
 20 See id. at 2509 (construing Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a) 
(2006)). 
 21 See id. at 2510. 
 22 See Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 220–21 (discussing the Court’s decision in great 
detail). 
 23 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516. 
 24 See id. at 2513–16. 
 25 Id. at 2512 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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§ 5 that the evidence in the record did not address ‘systematic differences 
between the covered and the non-covered areas of the United States.”28 
Following this discussion and raising serious doubts about section 5’s 
constitutionality, the opinion stated, “[W]e are keenly mindful of our 
institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of an 
Act of Congress is ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called 
on to perform.’”29 The Court then offered a superficial textual analysis of the 
bailout question, concluding, without any reasonable basis, that the utility 
district was entitled to bail out,30 thereby avoiding striking down the VRA and 
overruling earlier precedent.31 At the end of the day, the Supreme Court in 
NAMUDNO let section 5 of the VRA stand, while signaling strongly that next 
time around section 5 would not survive constitutional scrutiny in its current 
form. 
The Court’s use of anticipatory overruling is notable not only for its 
expansive use of the constitutional-avoidance doctrine to avoid a controversial 
decision but also for its subtle signaling of unconstitutionality, which contrasts 
with the Court’s more explicit past use of anticipatory overrulings.32 For 
example, in the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., the Court held that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was 
unconstitutional because it conferred Article III judicial powers on non-Article 
III bankruptcy judges.33 But the Court stayed its own ruling to give Congress 
“an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid 
means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of 
bankruptcy laws.”34 In more recent years, given the direction of the Court’s 
retroactivity jurisprudence, the Court has backed off such express anticipatory 
overrulings. 
 
 28 Id. (quoting The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional 
Law, New York University School of Law)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 29 Id. at 2513 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)). 
 30 Id. at 2513–14; accord Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 204–06. 
 31 Though the Court could have said it was merely distinguishing earlier cases holding that Congress 
acted within its powers in passing the preclearance provisions of the VRA, the public likely would not 
understand the distinction and view a decision striking down the VRA as an overruling of precedent. 
 32 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 651–63 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 33 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 34 Id. at 88; accord ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 32, at 653–54. 
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B. Invitations 
Invitations exist when one or more Justices invite (1) litigants to argue for 
the overruling or extension of precedent in future cases or (2) Congress to 
overrule Supreme Court statutory precedent. Here I briefly describe the 
Roberts Court cases in each category. 
In 2007, before Citizens United, the Supreme Court decided FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II).35 Like Citizens United, WRTL II 
raised questions about the constitutionality of limits on corporate spending in 
elections.36 I have described the complex facts of the case elsewhere.37 Here, it 
is enough to note that the Court held that a McCain–Feingold provision 
limiting corporate-funded, election-related television ads could not be applied 
to an ad mentioning U.S. Senate candidate Russ Feingold and his position on 
the filibustering of judicial nominees.38 Notably, the Court produced no 
majority opinion. In a concurrence joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, 
Justice Scalia took the position that the challenged provision was 
unconstitutional as applied to any corporate spending.39 Justice Scalia 
contended that McConnell and Austin should be overruled,40 a position the 
Court adopted three years later in Citizens United.41 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a narrower (and 
therefore controlling) opinion that did not reach the question of whether 
McConnell and Austin should be overruled.42 He instead concluded that the 
only corporate-funded advertisements that the law could bar constitutionally 
were those that were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” and he 
read “functional equivalency” very narrowly.43  Applying this new test, the 
 
 35 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 36 Id. at 457. 
 37 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1076–80 (2008). 
 38 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 476 (plurality opinion); id. at 503–04 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (construing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
§ 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006))). 
 39 See id. at 492–93. 
 40 See id. at 490, 499–504. 
 41 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 42 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 476, 480–81 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia was quite critical of the limited 
nature of the controlling opinion, stating, “This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” Id. at 499 n.7 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Professor Friedman criticized the controlling 
opinion as an example of stealth overruling. Friedman, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 43 See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 455–82 (plurality opinion). 
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controlling opinion held that the ad was not the “functional equivalent” of 
express advocacy against Senator Feingold: it did not mention Senator 
Feingold’s character or fitness for office and had no other clear indicia of the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.44 
Despite joining the Chief Justice’s controlling opinion, Justice Alito also 
issued a separate single-paragraph concurrence: 
I join the principal opinion because I conclude (1) that § 203 of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, as applied, cannot 
constitutionally ban any advertisement that may reasonably be 
interpreted as anything other than an appeal to vote for or against a 
candidate, (2) that the ads at issue here may reasonably be interpreted 
as something other than such an appeal, and (3) that because § 203 is 
unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements before us, it is 
unnecessary to go further and decide whether § 203 is 
unconstitutional on its face. If it turns out that the implementation of 
the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion impermissibly 
chills political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future case 
to reconsider the holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
that § 203 is facially constitutional.45 
Note that Justice Alito went out of his way to flag something everyone 
already knows: the courts are always open to an argument that old precedent 
should be overruled. But by emphasizing the fact that “presumably” an 
individual chilled by the Court’s ruling would argue for overruling McConnell 
in a future case, he appeared to invite litigants to raise such a challenge. 
Bill Araiza flags a similar, if subtler, example of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
use of an invitation in a recent Sixth Amendment case.46 In Rothgery v. 
Gillespie County, the Chief Justice joined Justice Souter’s majority opinion, 
but then separately described Justice Thomas’s dissent as “compelling,” 
concluding that “[a] sufficient case has not been made for revisiting those 
precedents, and accordingly I join in the Court’s opinion.”47 A careful reader 
would understand the Chief Justice to be inviting someone to make a forthright 
 
 44 Id. at 470, 480–81. 
 45 Id. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 46 See William D. Araiza, Playing Well with Others—but Still Winning: Chief Justice Roberts, Precedent, 
and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court 4–6 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers 
Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 220, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758001. 
 47 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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attack on those precedents in a future case.48 If not, what would be the point of 
the separate concurrence? 
Despite Justice Alito’s invitation in WRTL II, he also has consistently 
expressed the belief that courts should overrule precedent only when there is 
an explicit request, full briefing, and oral argument on the question. In Randall 
v. Sorrell, a case challenging a number of Vermont’s campaign finance laws, 
Justice Alito again filed a very short concurrence to a controlling (nonmajority) 
opinion.49 There, he noted that a party arguing for the overruling of a portion 
of Buckley v. Valeo50 had made the overruling argument only briefly in its 
ninety-nine pages of briefing.51 He concluded that “[w]hether or not a case can 
be made for reexamining Buckley in whole or in part, what matters is that 
respondents do not do so here, and so I think it unnecessary to reach the 
issue.”52 
Justice Alito made a similar point in his majority opinion last term in NASA 
v. Nelson.53 There, the Court declined to decide whether the Constitution 
contains a right to “informational privacy.”54 Instead, the Court assumed the 
right existed for the sake of argument and then held that the right, if it existed, 
was not violated in this particular case. Over Justice Scalia’s strong 
concurrence urging that the Court decide the constitutional question,55 Justice 
Alito responded that “[i]t is undesirable for us to decide a matter of this 
importance in a case in which we do not have the benefit of briefing by the 
parties and in which potential amici had little notice that the matter might be 
decided.”56 
Justice Alito’s desire to invite full briefing when overruling precedent is a 
possibility was likely on display in Citizens United itself. The Court first 
deferred deciding the case after it was argued in March 2009. Instead, the 
Court issued an order in June 2009 setting the case for supplemental briefing 
and reargument on the express question of whether Austin and McConnell 
 
 48 See Araiza, supra note 46, at 6 (“[The Chief Justice’s] strategy invites future litigants to suggest 
cabining that precedent, thus isolating and ultimately undermining it.”). 
 49 548 U.S. 230, 263–64 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 50 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 51 Randall, 548 U.S. at 264 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 52 Id. 
 53 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 54 Id.at 756–57. 
 55 Id. at 767–69 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 56 Id. at 756 n.10 (majority opinion). 
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should be overruled.57 The Court ultimately overruled those cases in an 
opinion issued in January 2010. 
While Justice Alito seems to be inviting litigants to argue forthrightly for 
the overruling of precedent when appropriate, Justice Ginsburg has directed 
her invitations to Congress. In a recent lecture on the value of dissenting 
opinions, Justice Ginsburg discussed the Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,58 noting that “[a]nother genre of dissent aims to 
attract immediate public attention and, thereby, to propel legislative change.”59 
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter, filed an action under Title VII 
alleging pay discrepancies because of her sex.60 Justice Ginsburg commented: 
A fit example, perhaps, is the dissent I summarized from the bench in 
2007 in Lilly Ledbetter’s case. Ledbetter worked as an area manager 
at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama; in 1997, she was the only 
woman Goodyear employed in such a post. Her starting salary (in 
1979) was in line with the salaries of men performing similar work. 
But over time, her pay slipped. By the end of 1997, there was a 
fifteen to forty percent disparity between Ledbetter’s pay and the 
salaries of her fifteen male counterparts. A federal jury found it 
“more likely than not that [Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal 
salary because of her sex.” The Supreme Court nullified that verdict, 
holding that Ledbetter filed her claim too late. 
It was incumbent on Ledbetter, the Court said, to file charges of 
discrimination each time Goodyear failed to increase her salary 
commensurate with the salaries of her male peers. Any annual pay 
decision not contested promptly (within 180 days), the Court ruled, 
became grandfathered, beyond the province of Title VII (our 
principal law prohibiting employment discrimination) ever to repair. 
The Court’s ruling, I observed for the four dissenters, ignored 
real-world employment practices that Title VII was meant to govern: 
“Sue early on,” the majority counseled, when it is uncertain whether 
discrimination accounts for the pay disparity you are beginning to 
experience, and when you may not know that men are receiving more 
 
 57 See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). For the procedural history of the case, see Hasen, 
Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 182, 206–13. Justice Alito’s attitude likely explains why he and 
Chief Justice Roberts did not join Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in voting to hear the challenge to the 
soft-money provisions of McCain–Feingold. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 621 n.262. 
 58 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 
123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 59 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010). 
 60 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621–22. 
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for the same work. (Of course, you would likely lose such a 
premature, less-than-fully-baked challenge.) If you sue only when the 
pay disparity becomes steady and large enough to enable you to 
mount a winnable case, you will be cut off at the Court’s threshold 
for suing too late. That situation, I urged, could not be what Congress 
intended when, in Title VII, it outlawed discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin in our Nation’s workplaces. 
“[T]he ball is in Congress’[s] court,” I wrote, “to correct [the 
Supreme] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.” 
Congress responded within days of the Court’s decision. Bills 
were introduced in the House and Senate to amend Title VII to make 
it plain that each paycheck a woman in Ledbetter’s situation received 
renewed the discrimination and restarted the time within which suit 
could be brought. Early in 2009, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act, and President Obama signed the corrective measure as 
one of his first actions after taking office.61 
Justice Ginsburg’s invitation in Ledbetter was clear to Congress. If 
Congress believed the Court got the statute wrong, “the ball [wa]s in 
Congress’[s] court.”62 And Congress took the ball and ran with it. 
C. Time Bombs 
Justices are sometimes more subtle than they are with invitations. I became 
familiar with the “time bombs” concept from Seth Stern and Steve Wermiel’s 
fascinating 2010 biography of Justice Brennan.63 Discussing Justice 
O’Connor’s reluctance to join one of Justice Brennan’s opinions, the authors 
wrote, “O’Connor had taken to heart [Justice] Powell’s warnings that Brennan 
planted ‘time bombs’ in his opinions. She had learned to watch for those 
seemingly offhand, throwaway phrases that he exploited in later cases.”64 
Unlike anticipatory overrulings and invitations, time bombs are more 
difficult to detect. How is one to know whether a Justice (or her clerk) has 
 
 61 Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 6–7 (first, second, third, fourth, and sixth alterations in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 62 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 63 SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010). 
 64 Id. at 493. I do not deal here with a different type of “time bomb” where a Court majority uses very 
broad language to decide a narrow, relatively unimportant issue, leaving open the possibility of applying that 
broad language more radically in an important future case. Arguably that description applies to the Court’s 5–4 
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). See 
Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch 
Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010). 
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consciously planted something for a future case? Alternatively, how is one to 
know whether a statement, citation, or dictum is merely inadvertent? There 
will rarely be a smoking gun, not even in a Justice’s files that are released 
years after a decision, indicating a Justice’s intentions, and therefore, one 
needs to go on suspicions. 
Consider, for example, a recent controversy over an obscure see citation in 
a 2008 campaign-finance case and its relevance to a recently decided Supreme 
Court decision. In Davis v. FEC,65 the Supreme Court, relying on Buckley’s 
rejection of the equality rationale for campaign-finance spending limits,66 
struck down a provision of the McCain–Feingold campaign-finance law giving 
U.S. House candidates the right to collect increased individual contributions 
for their campaigns when they faced a self-financed opponent spending large 
sums.67 
The controversy stemmed from the following passage in Alito’s majority 
opinion in Davis: 
Section 319(a) requires a candidate to choose between the First 
Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and 
subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. Many candidates 
who can afford to make large personal expenditures to support their 
campaigns may choose to do so despite § 319(a), but they must 
shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they make that 
choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359–1360 (CA8 1994) 
(concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a candidate’s 
expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds based on 
independent expenditures against her candidacy burdened the speech 
of those making the independent expenditures); Brief for Appellee 29 
(conceding that “[§]319 does impose some consequences on a 
candidate’s choice to self-finance beyond certain amounts”).68 
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of an Arizona public-financing law that 
gave participating candidates the right to additional public funding when 
facing large spending from a nonparticipating opponent or an independent 
expenditure effort.69 The Ninth Circuit had held that Arizona’s matching-fund 
 
 65 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008). 
 66 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (per curiam). 
 67 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 68 Id. at 2771–72 (alteration in original). 
 69 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). 
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provision did not violate the First Amendment under Davis.70 The Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion71 was contrary to the Eighth Circuit Day v. Holahan 
case72 cited by the Supreme Court in Davis.73 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, striking down the 
Arizona extra-matching-funds provision. In so doing, the Court not only cited 
Day once again but also referenced the fact that the Court had earlier cited Day 
in Davis for the proposition that these matching systems raise constitutional 
problems: 
[S]ee also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (C.A.8 1994) (it is 
“clear” that matching funds provisions infringe on “protected speech 
because of the chilling effect” they have “on the political speech of 
the person or group making the [triggering] expenditure” (cited in 
Davis, supra, at 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759)). The dissent’s disagreement is 
little more than disagreement with Davis.74 
As presented in Bennett, the Court had all but resolved this issue in Davis 
and signaled that resolution through its citation to Day. 
Intentionality is the remaining question. Was Justice Alito planting a time 
bomb so that the Court could later refer back to this citation from Davis as 
support for a ruling in Bennett striking down the Arizona matching-fund 
system? While we likely will never know his true intentions, it is certainly 
possible that this was what Justice Alito or a clerk had in mind in including the 
reference to the Day case in Davis.75 
 
 70 McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806. 
 71 See id. at 523 n.9 (stating that the citation of Day in Davis was for a limited proposition and did not 
create a precedent). 
 72 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 73 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772. 
 74 Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (second alteration in original). 
 75 Here is another recent example of a possible time bomb. The Supreme Court decided Washington State 
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008), while a controversial voter-identification 
case was pending before the Court. Rick L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for 
Shrinking Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.html. A key holding of Washington State Grange 
was that courts should favor as-applied over facial challenges in election law cases. See Wash. State Grange, 
552 U.S. at 458. When the case was decided, I suggested that Chief Justice Roberts “may be looking further 
ahead, to one of the most controversial cases of the term: Crawford v. Marion County, the Indiana voter 
identification law case. . . . The rule the Court has laid down now may not bode well for the Indiana voter ID 
law challengers.” Hasen, supra. Sure enough, in Crawford, the Court relied upon Washington State Grange in 
applying the rules as to as-applied challenges. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621–
22 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
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D. Inadvertence 
Inadvertence occurs when the Court changes the law without consciously 
attempting to do so, through attempts to restate existing law in line with the 
writing Justice’s values. Of course, it is possible that some of these 
misstatements of the law are intentional—either on the part of a Justice or 
Justices, or a clerk—as a surreptitious means of shifting the law without 
alerting the other Justices of the shift.76 But the issue of such devious 
motivation is very difficult to prove,77 and it is enough for my purposes to treat 
all cases of legal misstatements as those of inadvertence. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of the standards for issuing 
permanent injunctions. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., the Supreme 
Court reversed a “‘general rule,’ [of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit] unique to patent disputes, ‘that a permanent injunction will 
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.’”78 Unremarkably, 
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the question of 
the issuance of a permanent injunction must be judged on a case-by-case basis 
through the application of judicial discretion.79 It rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
special rule for patent injunctions.80 The surprise in the case came in the 
Court’s statement of the “well-established principles” applicable to the 
issuance of permanent injunctions: 
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a 
court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it 
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 
The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of 
 
 76 Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 
U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 670 (1979) (“It reads as though the Court were unaware of any case after Douglas, but the 
Court could have deliberately created that impression.”). 
 77 See id. at 669–79 (providing detailed analysis to determine possible Supreme Court Justices’ 
motivations in ignoring relevant precedent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and concluding that 
the reason for ignoring precedent was likely inadvertence). 
 78 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
 79 See id. at 391. 
 80 See id. at 393–94. 
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equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for 
abuse of discretion.81 
A major problem with the Supreme Court’s recitation of this supposedly 
“well-established” four-part test is that the test did not exist before. Professor 
Doug Rendleman explained that “[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the 
four-point test.”82 There was a familiar four-part test for the issuance of 
preliminary injunctions, but it was not this same test.83 The test for preliminary 
injunctions, which looks in part at future likelihood of success on the merits, 
“make[s] no sense as applied to permanent injunctions.”84 
So how did this new test come into being in eBay? Professor Laycock 
explains what appears to be Justice Thomas’s inadvertence: 
EBay and many of its amici, and the U.S. Solicitor General, who 
was supporting MercExchange, all referred to some version of four 
traditional considerations relevant to injunctive relief. They did not 
all cite the same four factors, and none of the lead briefs offered 
anything so flat footed as the Court’s formulation. The Court appears 
to have mostly taken its four-part test from the district court, which 
took it from one earlier district court opinion; putting irreparable 
injury in the past tense appears to have been an innovation by Justice 
Thomas or one of his clerks. And because the opinion gives no hint 
how any of the four parts of the test apply to the facts of the case, its 
abstract pronouncement has no real content. The case was litigated by 
an all-star cast of Supreme Court lawyers, but none of them consulted 
a remedies specialist.85 
But Court inadvertence takes on a life of its own.86 The eBay test has now 
been cited and applied by numerous lower courts,87 and the Court recently 
reaffirmed it as the “traditional four-factor test” last term in Monsanto Co. v. 
 
 81 Id. at 391 (citations omitted). 
 82 Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. 
LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007); accord DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 273 (8th ed. 2011). 
 83 Rendleman, supra note 82, at 76 n.71. 
 84 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 426 (4th ed. 2010) 
(emphasis added). The test also suffers from other problems, such as that the first and second elements appear 
to be asking the same question. Id. at 426–27. 
 85 Id. at 427. 
 86 See id. (“There was no such test before, but there is now.”). 
 87 See id. (“By early May 2010, eBay had been cited more than 4,100 times.”). 
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Geertson Seed Farms.88 “And once again the Court appeared oblivious to any 
difference between permanent and preliminary injunctions.”89 
In the eBay and Monsanto cases, the law moved significantly through 
apparent inadvertence. The term “inadvertence” might suggest some 
randomness, but I expect inadvertent mistakes to more systematically reflect 
the value judgments of the Justice drafting the opinion. The causal mechanism 
for such a bias is straightforward: an error in stating existing law (or 
inadvertent change of law) in a draft opinion is less likely to capture the 
attention of a Justice reviewing a draft opinion if the error is in line with what 
the Justice expects the law to be. 
The eBay case provides a nice example of the nonrandomness of 
inadvertence. In applying the (new) four-part test, the Court’s analysis in 
Monsanto increased the burdens on plaintiffs seeking permanent injunctions.90 
Before eBay, the common understanding was that it was up to a defendant to 
raise the question of the public interest as a kind of affirmative defense if the 
defendant believed the injunction sought by the plaintiff did not serve the 
public interest.91 Under the new test, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the public interest “would not be disserved” by a permanent injunction.92 
As Professor Laycock asks: “Might this mean that benefits to the public 
interest cannot count in favor of issuing the injunction, but that harm to the 
public interest is an absolute reason not to issue it? Did Justice Thomas choose 
that phrasing deliberately in eBay, or might it be inadvertent?”93 Whatever 
Justice Thomas intended, he has certainly written or signed onto a number of 
opinions in recent years that make it harder for plaintiffs to obtain an 
injunction and easier for defendants to seek modifications of injunctions that 
ease the burden on defendants.94 His inadvertence appears to line up with his 
values. 
 
 88 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (2010). 
 89 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 26 (2011 Teachers’ Update). 
 90 See 130 S. Ct. at 2757 (“It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask 
whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; rather, a court must determine that an 
injunction should issue under the traditional four-factor test set out above.”). 
 91 See LAYCOCK, supra note 84, at 426–27. 
 92 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 93 LAYCOCK, supra note 89, at 4. 
 94 See, e.g., Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743; see also Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009) (“The 
party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief, but once a party 
carries this burden, a court abuses its discretion ‘when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in 
light of such changes.’’’ (citation omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997))); Winter v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008) (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only 
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II. COMPARING THE WAYS JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW 
Part I demonstrated that Justices have more ways to move the law besides 
express and stealth overruling. I now turn to the question when Justices may 
wish to use anticipatory overrulings, invitations, or time bombs. I put aside the 
scenario in which a Justice decides to use the tool of inadvertence—itself a 
logical impossibility. 
Anticipatory overrulings can be aimed at either Congress or the public. By 
giving advanced warning or suggestion as to what a Court is going to do in a 
future case, the Court can give Congress (or another legislative body, in an 
appropriate case) a chance to make a change in law to forestall overruling. In 
the case of the VRA issue in NAMUDNO, for example, election law scholars 
have read the Court’s decision as implicitly urging Congress to change aspects 
of the Act so that the Court would not strike down the law as 
unconstitutional.95 
Justices might aim anticipatory overrulings at the public as well. 
Elsewhere, I have contrasted the Court’s use of the constitutional-avoidance 
doctrine in NAMUDNO with its use of an “anti-avoidance canon” to reach out 
and decide the constitutional issue in Citizens United.96 One possible 
explanation for the different treatment in the two cases is that the Court had 
already given signals to the public before Citizens United in cases like WRTL II 
 
on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such 
relief.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Gerken: Can Congress Take a Hint?, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 23, 2009, 
8:15 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013911.html (“The real worry for supporters of Section 5 is the 
possibility that the Court’s liberals thought that sending a crystal clear, united message to Congress was 
Section 5’s best hope. That is, the four Justices on the Court may have been as convinced as many 
commentators are that Section 5 will fall when the case returns, and they were hoping that a unanimous 
opinion would light a fire under Congress. To me, the fact that the four liberal Justices joined the opinion 
represents a pretty big hint that Congress needs to act. The question is whether Congress can take the hint.”); 
Richard H. Pildes, A Warning to Congress, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG (June 23, 2009, 11:30 AM), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-battle-not-the-war-on-voting-rights/#richard 
(“Congress might conclude that it would be wise to update the act rather than remaining silent and leaving the 
next word to an obviously skeptical court.”). For an alternative reading of NAMUDNO as the product of 
strategic compromise among conservative and liberal justices, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act 
Through the Justices’ Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 19–23 (2009), 
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso1.pdf. 
 96 See Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4 (concluding that the different use of the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance in the two cases is the result of selective employment of the doctrine). 
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that it was poised to strike down corporate-spending limits.97 In contrast, the 
Court had not sent any signals to the public that the VRA was in danger of 
being struck down. Although I flagged that possibility as far back as 2005,98 
the issue was really not on the public’s radar screen until NAMUDNO. If the 
Court comes back in a later case and strikes down the VRA, NAMUDNO 
would have served as a warning to the public, and perhaps the warning, 
coupled with congressional inaction after the warning, could serve to blunt 
public criticism of the Court that could follow after such a controversial ruling. 
Invitations to litigants, such as the invitations issued by Justice Alito, may 
signal to a litigant that now is a good time to ask for the overturning of 
precedent. Although the Court cannot pick which cases come up for possible 
review, invitations to litigants may make it more likely for a Justice to shape 
the Court’s docket. This may be especially true in challenges to federal 
campaign-finance laws, which, thanks to special jurisdictional provisions, 
often come to the Court on direct appeal, making it more likely that the Court 
will hear the case on the merits. 
It is also no coincidence that Justice Ginsburg, a frequent liberal dissenter 
in 5–4 cases on a conservative Court, is inviting Congress to overturn the 
Court in statutory cases (rather than inviting litigants to bring more cases). 
Justice Ginsburg is less likely than Justice Alito to get her preferences 
approved by the current Supreme Court, and so it is unsurprising that she is 
signaling Congress when there is an especially worthy Court statutory decision 
for Congress to consider overruling. 
Time bombs, because of their subtlety, work differently. They are aimed at 
stacking the deck, or boxing in the Justices, in future cases in which related 
issues arise. They are meant to be subtle enough to avoid attracting the 
attention of other Justices who may disagree with the future use of the 
language included in the Court’s opinion. That the Supreme Court in the 
Bennett case ultimately relied upon the oblique citation of Day in Davis as 
authority for reversing the Ninth Circuit is some evidence that Justice Alito’s 
potential time bomb paid off. Time bombs also may serve to diffuse public 
opposition to controversial rulings. A ruling that appears to follow from earlier 
precedent, as opposed to breaking from precedent, is apt to be less 
 
 97 Hasen, supra note 37, at 1069 (“However, the Court dropped an important footnote suggesting 
corporate spending limits in candidate elections might be permissible to prevent corruption of candidates.”). 
 98 See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005). 
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controversial. This is true even if the Court is merely following dicta or an off-
handed comment in an earlier case. But time bombs have a disadvantage: they 
are easier to ignore or dismiss than the more direct means of influencing how 
the Court decides cases. 
All of these tools send signals to the lower courts. While lower courts do 
not have authority to ignore binding Supreme Court authority, lower courts can 
interpret cases in ways that are equivalent to overruling or use procedural 
devices, such as standing, to reach results in line with what the judges predict 
to be current Supreme Court majority preference.99 
The following chart demonstrates the audience, as well as the potential 




 99 On this point, see Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010). 
HASEN GALLEYS5 7/12/2012  3:36 PM 
798 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:779 





Future Supreme Court, 
lower courts, 
Congress, litigants, 
and the public 
Potential public and 
scholarly criticism 
Clear change in law 
binding on all 
parties 





criticism that the 







Congress and the 
public 
Leaves law in place 
that is at odds with 









and the public, and 
can prepare the 
public for an 




Litigants Less direct than 
express, stealth, or 
anticipatory 
overruling; and 
leaves the law in 
place 
Helps shape issues 
on the Court’s 
docket and 
influences the 
direction of the law 
Invitation (to 
Congress) 
Congress Puts matters in the 
hands of Congress, 
not the Court, and is 
less direct than other 
tools 
Provides an 
additional way for a 
Justice in the 
minority on the 
Court to direct 
change in law 
Time Bomb Future Supreme Court 
and possibly lower 
courts  
Less direct than 
express, stealth, or 
anticipatory 
overruling; and could 
be ignored by a future 
Court 
Can “fly under the 
radar” and affect 
changes in law over 
the long term, and 





Inadvertence Future Supreme Court 
and lower courts 
Not an express tool 
(occurs by accident) 
and can move the law 
in unintended ways 
Can “fly under the 
radar” and affect 
changes in law over 
the long term, and 






HASEN GALLEYS5 7/12/2012  3:36 PM 
2012] HOW SUPREME COURT JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW 799 
CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court Justices have more tools at their disposal to change the law 
than first appears. Beyond express overruling or extension of precedent, and 
even beyond stealth overruling, Justices can move the law in many ways, 
including through anticipatory overrulings, invitations, time bombs, and 
inadvertence. But the various tools for moving the law come with their own 
costs and benefits, and are aimed at different audiences. Not all tools are 
appropriate in each circumstance. 
Perhaps the most significant part of this analysis is the demonstration that 
the Court can move the law even when Justices do not intend to do so. The 
eBay example shows the importance for lawyers and law professors to keep up 
on cases in their fields and to offer amicus help aimed solely at assisting the 
Court in avoiding inadvertent major changes in the law. Whatever one thinks 
of the various devices Justices may use to move the law, the law should move 
only when the Justices want the law to move.100 
 
 100 As this Article went to press, two new Supreme Court actions once again demonstrated the tools that 
Justices may use to move the law. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a case concerning corporate 
liability under the Alien Tort Statute, the Court issued an order a few days after oral argument asking for the 
parties to brief a broader question about the extraterritorial reach of the statute. 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012); see 
also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction in a Human Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2012, at A15. I suggested that this reargument order is consistent with Justice Alito’s views, explained 
in this Article, that precedent should not be overturned or expanded without full briefing or argument. Rick 
Hasen, Fingerprints of Justice Alito All over Kiobel Reargument Order: Citizens United Déjà Vu, ELECTION L. 
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=31067. 
In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, the Supreme Court temporarily stayed a Montana 
Supreme Court decision that held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United did not prevent 
Montana from enacting a ban on corporate spending in candidate elections. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 
132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012). The order was to last until the Court acted on a petition for writ of certiorari in the 
case. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, issued the following statement with respect to the granting of 
the stay: 
Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere since this Court’s decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC, make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that independent expenditures by corporations ‘do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.’ A petition for writ of certiorari will 
give the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the huge sums currently deployed 
to buy candidates’ allegiance, Citizens United should continue to hold sway. Because lower 
courts are bound to follow this Court’s decision until they are withdrawn or modified, however, I 
vote to grant the stay. 
Id. at 1307–08. 
Court watcher Tom Goldstein viewed Justice Ginsburg’s statement as an invitation for amici to file 
briefs at the certiorari stage of the case. Tom Goldstein, The Supreme Court, Citizens United II, and the 
November Election [Updated], SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2012, 8:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/ 
the-supreme-court-citizens-united-ii-and-the-november-election/. I viewed this statement as Justice Ginsburg 
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signaling her opportunity to “speak truth to power.” Richard L. Hasen, Occupy the Super PACs, SLATE (Feb. 
20, 2012, 7:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/02/justice_ruth_bader_ 
ginsburg_is_ready_to_speak_out_on_the_danger_of_super_pacs_.html. At the end of the Supreme Court’s 
Term, the Court summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court, with Justice Breyer writing a dissent for 
himself and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor arguing that the Court should have taken the case to 
reconsider Citizens United. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 80 U.S.L.W. 3701 (2012) (per curiam). 
 
